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SOME PHASES OF TITLE EXAMINATION AND
REAL ESTATE PRACTICE
CiAmLES T. BoYD*
Real estate law still constitutes a large field of practice in North
Carolina. As the State becomes more and more industrialized, and
its general progress continues, the volume of real estate work grows.
Lawyers are employed in a large percentage of loan and purchase
transactions. The purpose of this article is to present and discuss a
few of the matters which arise in the course of title examination and
real estate practice, without undertaking to make even a cursory sum-
mary of the entire field. The subjects covered are as follows: (1)
Statutory Cancellation of Mortgages and Deeds of Trust; (2) Me-
chanics', Laborers' and Materialmen's Liens; (3) Conveyances by
Heir or Devisee within Two Years from Death of Decedent; (4) Vio-
lation of Trust Relationship in Foreclosure Sales; (5) Examination of
Trustee's Adverse Conveyances; (6) Examination of Title to Ease-
ment Rights;. (7) Building Restrictions; (8) Parol Trusts; (9)
Lunacy; (10) Lis Pendens; (11) Matters Not of Record; (12) Tax
Deeds; and (13) Closings.
STATUTORY CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST
Since a mortgage or deed of trust is an encumbrance upon title
during the continuance of the debt, it should be removed upon the
satisfaction of the debt. At common law the method of removal was
by release deed,. by which the title was reconveyed to the grantor or to
the subsequent owner. Under modern business conditions this method
of mortgage satisfaction is cumbersome, as it requires a deed of con-
veyance in each case. This situation gave rise to statutory cancellation
which makes a deed unnecessary. The various methods of statutory
cancellation in North Carolina are set out in Section 2594 of the North
Carolina Code Annotated.
Subsection 1 of said section provides for marginal cancellation by
the trustee or mortgagee or his or her legal representative or the duly
authorized agent or attorney of such trustee, mortgagee, or legal repre-
sentative. This is a personal cancellation entered upon the margin of
the record by the person making the cancellation, in the presence of
the Register of Deeds or his deputy, who witnesses the signature of the
person making the cancellation and also affixes his name as witness.
* Member North Carolina State and American Bar Associations; member of
the law firm of York & Boyd, Greensboro, North Carolina.
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It will be noted that this subsection provides for cancellation in person
by the party in whom legal title to the land is vested. The cestui que
trust under a deed of trust is not empowered under this subsection to
make a personal cancellation on the margin, although this has been
frequently done. Neither is the personal representative of the cestui
que trust under a deed of trust permitted to make a personal cancella-
tion under this subsection. A duly authorized agent or attorney of the
trustee, mortgagee, or legal representative of the trustee or mortgagee
may make a cancellation under this subsection.
There have been a great many irregular marginal cancellations by
payees or assignees of the mortgage indebtedness. Such cancellations
have been made under the impression that such cancellation is author-
ized by the statute. However, an examination of the wording of the
section shows that it is not permitted and it has been necessary to
correct many such cancellations by having the mortgagee or trustee
enter marginal satisfaction, or by production of the notes and the mort-
gage deed or deed of trust. The point to be borne in mind is that
statutory cancellations must be made strictly in accordance with the
language of the statute.
Subsection 2 provides that upon the exhibition of any mortgage,
deed of trust or other instrument intended to secure the payment of
money, accompanied by the bonds or notes, to the Register of Deeds or
his deputy, where the same is registered, with the endorsement of pay-
ment and satisfaction appearing thereon by the payee, mortgagee,
trustee or assignee of the same, or by any chartered, active banking in-
stitution in the State of North Carolina, when so endorsed in the name
of the bank by an officer thereof, the Register or his deputy shall can-
cel the mortgage or other instrument by entry, of "Satisfaction" on the
margin of the record. This subsection has no application to cancella-
tion in person and provides a method for removing mortgage liens
upon the presentation of the mortgage deed or deed of trust, together
with all the notes secured thereby. If all the notes are not presented,
the Register should not make the entry of satisfaction. Satisfaction
may be entered if the papers are marked paid in full by the payee of
the notes, the mortgagee, trustee or assignee. If the papers show on
their face that they have been assigned, the Register would not be
justified in cancelling if they are marked paid by the payee. Likewise,
for the assignee or holder to mark the papers satisfied, the assignment
must be found thereon, unless the notes or bonds are payable to bearer.
This subsection also provides for entry of satisfaction by the
Register upon the papers being presented marked paid and satisfied by
any chartered banking institution of the State of North Carolina. Many
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mortgage papers are sent through banks for collection and this part of
the subsection provides for a convenient method of cancellation. It
was argued in Richmond Guano Co. v. Walston' that this subsection
does not provide for the entry of satisfaction by the Register upon
presentation of notes and deed of trust marked satisfied and paid, inas-
much as the language of the statute provided that "the register or his
deputy shall cancel the mortgage or other instrument by entry of satis-
faction." The court, however, held that it was the intent of this sub-
section to embrace deeds of trust as well as mortgage deeds.
The last part of this subsection 2 provides for entry of satisfaction
by the Register of a mortgage deed or deed of trust upon exhibition of
the mortgage or deed of trust providing for payment of money which
does not call for or recite any notes secured by it. Under the circum-
stances, the Register may enter satisfaction upon exhibition of such
mortgage or deed of trust marked paid and satisfied.
Subsection 3 provides that upon the exhibition 6f any mortgage,
deed of trust, or other instrument intended to secure the payment of
money by the grantor or mortgagor, his agent or attorney, together
with the notes or bonds secured thereby, to the Register of Deeds or
his deputy of the county where the same is registered, the deed of trust,
mortgage, notes or bonds being at the time of said exhibition more than
ten years old, counting from the date of maturity of the last note or
bond, the Register or his deputy shall make proper entry of cancella-
tion and satisfaction of said instrument on the margin of the record
where the same is recorded, whether there be any such entries on the
original papers or not. This subsection provides a method for cancella-
tion where the mortgage papers are more than ten years old from the
date of maturity of the last note presented by the grantor or mortgagor,
his agent or attorney, the theory being that if the party who made the
lien, or his agent, has the mortgage and notes in his possession, even
though they are not marked paid, he is entitled to cancellation.
The second paragraph of subsection 3 was added by Chapter 47 of
the Public Laws of 1935 and provides that upon presentation of any
deed of trust given to secure the bearer or holder of any negotiable in-
strument transferable by delivery, together with all the evidences of
indebtedness secured thereby, marked paid and satisfied in full and
signed by the bearer or holder thereof, to the Register of Deeds or his
deputy of the county in which same is recorded, the said Register or
his deputy shall cancel such deed of trust by entry of satisfaction upon
the record and such entry of satisfaction shall be valid and binding upon
all persons. There is a proviso which gives the owner of such evidences
of indebtedness as may have been lost or stolen the right to have a
1 187 N. C. 667, 122 S. E. 663 (1924).
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marginal entry made on the record in order to prevent such cancella-
tion. The purpose of this paragraph is to facilitate the cancellation of
deeds of trust securing a series of notes or bonds. Oftentimes, the
notes fall into different hands and the purpose of the paragraph is to
enable the bearer who is in possession of all the notes and the deed of
trust to obtain immediate cancellation.
Subsection 4 of said section is as follows: "Every such entry thus
made by the Register of Deeds or his deputy, and every such entry
thus acknowledged and witnessed, shall operate and have the same ef-
fect to release and discharge all the interest of such trustee, mortgagee
or representative in such deed or mortgage as if a deed of release or
reconveyance thereof had been fully executed and recorded." The
effect of this section is to give to every cancellation made by the Register
the same effect as a deed of release or reconveyance would have. In
other words, the cancellation as provided for by statute, while in itself
not a reconveyance of the legal title, has the same effect as a recon-
veyance of the legal title.
Subsection 5 is as follows: "The conditions of every mortgage, deed
of trust, or other instrument securing the payment of money shall be
conclusively presumed to have been complied with or the debts secured
thereby paid as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consid-
eration from the trustor, mortgagor, or grantor, from and after the
expiration of fifteen years from the date when the conditions of such
instrument by the terms thereof are due to have been complied with,
or the maturity of the last installment of debt or interest secured thereby
unless the holder of the indebtedness secured by said instrument or
party secured by any provision thereof shall file an affidavit with the
Register of Deeds in the county where such instrument is registered, in
which shall be specifically stated the amount of the debt unpaid, which
is secured by said instrument, or in what respect any other condition
thereof shall not have been complied with, whereupon the Register of
Deeds shall record such affidavit and refer on the margin of the record.
of the instrument referred to therein the fact of the filing of such af-
fidavit, and a reference to the book and page where it is recorded. Or
in lieu of such affidavit the holder may enter on the margin of the record
any payments that-have been made on the indebtedness secured by such
instrument, and shall in such entry state the amount still due there-
under. This entry must be signed by the holder and witnessed by the
Register of Deeds. Provided, however, that this subsection shall not
apply to any deed, mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument made
or given by anfrailroad company, or to any agreement of conditional
sale, equipment trust agreement, lease, chattel mortgage or other in-
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strument relating to the sale, purchase or lease of railroad equipment
on rolling stock, or of personal property."
The effect of this subsection is to create a statute of limitations of
fifteen years from the date of the maturity of the last note against
creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the trustor,
mortgagor, or grantor, unless the affidavit provided for has been filed
or the original entry made. Oftentimes mortgages and deeds of trust,
though paid, are not marked off the records and stand in the way of a
clear title to the property. The notes and mortgage instruments may
not be available in the hands of the grantor or mortgagor and cancella-
tion cannot be had. This subsection was passed in 1923 to become ef-
fective January 1, 1924, and the Supreme Court soon held that it could
not be construed retroactively so as to affect those who became creditors
prior to its passage.2 During the fifteen-year period following the pas-
sage of the Act the subsection was of no practical value. However, the
fifteen-year period from the effective date having expired on January
1, 1939, there may now be cases where mortgages and deeds of trust,
given after the effective date, may be barred of enforcement by the
terms of this statute.
There are numerous North Carolina cases involving the point of
irregular cancellation. The question usually arises in a suit between
the holder of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage alleged to have
been irregularly cancelled and a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer.
The rule is that if the cancellation is in the exact manner prescribed by
the statute, without variance, a subsequent bona fide purchaser or en-
cumbrancer, for value, may rely thereon. However, if there is any-
thing in the entry of satisfaction or in the circumstances surrounding
the transaction which would put a third party on notice, the holder of
the original indebtedness is protected. For instance, if the instrument
is cancelled before the maturity of all the notes,3 or if the instrument
is cancelled by someone other than the person permitted to cancel under
the statute,4 or if the entry of satisfaction refers to one bond, when as
a matter of fact there are several bonds secured by the mortgage or
deed of trust,5 it is held that there is notice to the subsequent purchaser
or encumbrancer, and the original holder of the indebtedness will be
protected. A forged cancellation is void as against the mortgagee.0
'Dixie Grocery Co. v. Hoyle, 204 N. C. 109, 167 S. E. 469 (1933) ; Humphrey
v. Stephens, 191 N. C. 101, 131 S. E. 383 (1926); Hicks, Admr. v. Kearney,
189 N. C. 316, 127 S. E. 205 (1925); N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §17.
'Wynn v. Grant, 166 N. C. 39, 81 S. E. 949 (1914).
'Mills v. Kemp, 196 N. C. 309, 145 S. E. 557 (1928).
'Ibid.
'Swindell v. Stephens, 193 N. C. 474, 137 S. E. 420 (1927); Union Central
Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 193 N. C. 456, 137 S. E. 324 (1927).
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MECHANICS', LABORERS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
In real estate transactions involving new construction, the matter of
mechanics', laborers' and materialmeri's liens is an important one.
There may or may not be a public record of liens claimed. The stat-
utes provide lien security for laborers and materialmen in two classes
of cases. The first is where the claimant has direct contractual rela-
tions with the owner of the property. The second is where the claimant
has had no contractual dealings with the owner but has furnished labor
or material to a contractor or sub-contractor. In handling a loan, pur-
chase, lease or other transaction in connection with property which is
newly repaired or constructed, search should be made of the records, to
see if any liens have been filed, and there should also be inquiry outside
the public records to see if any claims remain unpaid. If so, it is ad-
visable to take protection against such claims either through payment,
waiver of lien, title insurance or indemnity bond. We treat firstly the
case of a lien arising out of direct contractual relations with the owner
and secondly the right of lien based on the furnishing of labor or mate-
rials to a contractor or sub-contractor.
Nature of the lien. "Every building built, rebuilt, repaired or im-
proved, together with the necessary lots on which such building is
situated ... shall be subject to a lien for the payment of all debts con-
tracted for work done on the same or material furnished.' 7
This is a statutory lien conferred by the laws of North Carolina
upon mechanics, laborers and materialmen who furnish labor and ma-
terial for the betterments upon the property of the owner with whom
they have entered into a contractual relation. The statutes conferring
and enforcing the liens are designed to protect those who but for the
statute would have no security except the personal obligation of the
person for whom the work is done or to whom the materials are fur-
nished. The lien also attaches to the land upon which the building is
situated. This lien is statutory, given to enforce the debt, and without
a debt there can be no lien.8
Lien upon property -of a married wmnan. A lien may be filed
against property which stands in the name of the husband alone or in
the name of the wife alone, or in their joint names. Formerly, before
a married woman had a right to contract in her own name with respect
to her separate estate the lien could not be filed against her separate
property.
The former status of a married woman's estate created a hardship
7N. C. Coma ANt. (Michie, 1939) §2433.
8 Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90
S. E. 923 (1916) ; Weathers v. Borders, 124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899) ; Boone
v. Chatfield, 118 N. C. 916, 24 S. E. 745 (1896) ; Wilkie v. Bray, 71 N. C. 205(1874).
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upon furnishers of labor and materials. Section 2434 of the Code has
remedied this situation and allows the lien upon the property of a
married woman when it appears that a building was completed or re-
paired on her land with her consent or procurement. In such case she
shall be deemed to have contracted for such improvement.
Filing of notice. If the debt is against any interest in real estate
regardless of the amount, notice of lien must be filed in the office of
the Clerk of the Court in the county where the labor was performed or
the material furnished. 9
The notice of lien shall specify in detail the character and amount
of materials furnished or labor performed, and the time thereof. Also
an adequate description of the property upon which the lien is claimed
must be given. Without such particulars a lien is irregular and void.10
If the lien as filed is defective an amendment cannot be allowed by
the court in the action to enforce the lien."' The reason given is that
the mechanics' lien is not a process on pleading but an instrument filed
for record and therefore the court has no power to allow amendments
thereof. In Jefferson v. Bryant12 the notice of lien did not set out the
date of furnishing the labor and materials. In an action to enforce the
lien in Superior Court an amendment was allowed supplying the needed
information. On appeal it was held that the lien as filed was defective
and that the Superior Court had no power to allow an amendment. If
"the law were otherwise, the claimant would be allowed to correct the
errors in his notice at any time.
The notice of lien shall be filed at any time within six months after
the completion of the labor or the furnishing of the materials.' 3 Upon
being properly filed, within the given time, the lien relates back to the
first furnishing of labor or materials.' 4 Thus it appears that a person
furnishing labor or material has for filing his lien a period of time ex-
tending from the beginning of furnishing of labor and materials until
the completion thereof, plus six months.
Priority of liens. As among liens themselves, where the lien is based
on a debt between the owner and claimant, all claims filed and proved
are paid and settled according to the priority of the notice of lien filed
with the Clerk.' 5 This is true even though a claimant who files last
began to furnish materials or labor at an earlier date than the claimant
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2469.
"0 Jefferson v. Bryant, 161 N. C. 404, 77 S. E. 341 (1913) ; Cook v. Cobb, 101
N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888) ; Wray v. Harris, 77 N. C. 77 (1877).
"Jefferson v. Bryant, 161 N. C. 404, 77 S. E. 341 (1913); Cook v. Cobb,
101 N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888).
12161 N. C. 404, 77 S. E. 341 (1913).
'*N. C. CODE A,,N. (Michie, 1939), §2470.
"' Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 794 (1896); Burr v. Maultsby,
99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
'IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2471.
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who files first.16 But as between liens and other subsequently acquired
interests, since each lien, when properly perfected, relates back to the
time the claimant began to furnish, the lien, when so perfected, will
take priority over all those who claim to have acquired an interest in
the land after the date upon which the first labor or material was fur-
nished. Therefore, the fact that a lien relates back may give it priority
over mortgagees or others who have acquired interests in the property,
but will not give it priority over another lien which has been filed earlier.
Suit to enforce lien. The action to enforce the lien must be com-
menced within six months from the date of filing the notice.17 But if
the debt is not due within six months, suit may be brought or other
proceedings instituted to enforce the lien in thirty days after it is due.
Failure to commence action within the time specified discharges the
lien.' 8 But even after the lien ig lost, the claimant may still have a
civil action on the debt against the owner and the ordinary statute of
limitations would apply as to the time in which said action might be
brought.
Execution. Section 2477 of the Code provides that upon judgment
rendered in favor of the claimant the execution for the collection and
enforcement thereof shall be in the ordinary manner except that the
execution shall direct the officer to sell all the right, title and interest
which the owner had in the particular premises at the time of filing
notice of the lien, before such execution is extended to the general
property of the defendant. The judgment for the debt is, of course,
a lien against all of the property of the defendant owner-the statute
merely provides that the property subject to the lien must be sold
first.19
No execution for the enforcement of a lien issued by a Justice of
the Peace shall be enforced against real estate or any interest therein.
The Justice's judgment may be docketed in the Superior Court for the
purpose of selling such estate or any interest therein. The correct legal
procedure seems to be that if a lien is claimed against real estate and
the amount of the debt is less than $200.00, the lien is to be filed with
the Clerk of the Court, judgment taken before a Justice of Peace, and
the judgment docketed in the Superior Court in order that the execu-
tion may issue to satisfy the lien.
20
Priority between mortgages and liens. A mortgage or deed of trust
recorded before the furnishing of labor and material takes priority over
"Boykin v. Logan, 203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932).
17 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2474.8 Norfleet v. Tarboro Cotton Factory, 172 N. C. 833, 89 S. E. 785 (1916).
21 McMillan v. Williams, 109 N. C. 252, 13 S. E. 764 (1891).
" Smaw v. Cohen, 95 N. C. 85 (1886).
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a lien subsequently perfected.21 This is true even where the lien is for
construction purposes and the money paid out from time to time. The
theory is that the person furnishing labor or materials has notice of the
mortgage and therefore can only claim a lien upon the owner's equity.
The rule applies the ordinary doctrine of taking with notice. However,
as was noted above, a lien properly filed and enforced will take priority
over a mortgage or deed of trust recorded after the date on which the
claimant began to furnish labor or material, as the lien relates back to
the beginning of performance.
Homestead exemption. Labor liens come ahead of the owner's
homestead exemption. A materialman's lien does not come ahead of
the homestead exemption except in a case where the entire building is
put up by one man; in such an instance the contractor has a lien which
will come ahead of the homestead exemption.
22
We come now to the rights of sub-contractors and those who have
furnished labor or materials to sub-contractors or the general con-
tractor.
Lien of sub-contractors, etc. Section 2437 of the Code creates a
lien in favor of the sub-contractors and laborers who are employed to
furnish or who do furnish labor or material for the construction of im-
provements on real estate. This is a lien created by statute for the
purpose of protecting those who contribute to the betterments on the
property of the owner without having contractual relations with the
owner, the contract being generally with the original or general con-
tractor. In the case where the owner makes a contract for the construc-
tion of a building with a general contractor and pays out the money to
him, there exists a possibility that the contractor will fail to pay the
persons who have furnished labor and materials and these latter people
would be left without a remedy except a civil suit against the contractor.
To remedy this situation the legislature has passed successive statutes
designed to furnish protection to the sub-contractor, laborer and ma-
terialman to the extent of what is due the contractor by the owner.23
How lien acquired. The lien is acquired by giving notice to and
furnishing an itemized statement of the account to the owner before
payment by the owner to the general contractor. Liens acquired in
"Harris v. Cheshire, 189 N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925) ; McAdams v. Pied-
mont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914) ; Cox v. New Bern Lighting
& Fuel Co., 152 N. C. 164, 67 S. E. 477 (1910); Cheesborough v. Sanatorium,
134 N. C. 245, 46 S. E. 494 (1904); Baker v. Robbins, 119 N. C. 289, 25 S. E.
876 (1896).
IIN. C. CoNsT. Art. XIV, §4; Isler v. Dixon, 140 N. C. 529, 53 S. E. 348
(1906); Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896).
"
3Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418(1914).
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this manner are limited to the extent of the amount due the contractor,
which amount shall not exceed the original contract price.24 This limit
is placed upon the owner's liability for the reason that it would work ani
undue hardship upon him to pay the contractor the full price and then
have to pay for labor and materials perhaps to the full extent of all fur-
nished if it should happen that the general contractor failed to pay any
of his bills.
If the contractor is paid in advance so that no money is due him
after work has begun, then no lien can be had against the property of
the owner.25
The notice furnished by the claimant to the owner must be an actual
notice. It is not sufficient that the owner knew that labor and materials
were being supplied and furnished for the betterment of his property.26
The lien is acquired by giving notice to the owner and a claim of
lien does not have to be filed with the Clerk of the Court. This is
expressly provided in Section 2441 of the Code and in numerous de-
cided cases.27
Rights acquired by giving notice. By filing notice and the itemized
statement claimant acquires a lien on the property of the owner and
also the right to participate in the fund due by the owner to the general
contractor. This fund is really a trust fund.28 The leading case on the
rights acquired by a claimant when he files his notice is Foundry Co. v.
Aluminum Co.2 9 The claimant acquires a lien on the property and also
the right to participate in the trust fund. Section 2439 of the Code
provides that the contractor must furnish to the owner a list of the
people who are due money from him. It is the owner's duty to hold
out this money in his settlement with the contractor. It is the owner's
duty, after notice is given, to pay the claimant out of the money due the
contractor. If the owner does pay, he is in no worse position than if
he paid the contractor directly, for his liability is limited to the amount
due the contractor. If, however, the owner fails to pay the claimant
and either withholds the money or pays the contractor, a personal lia-
bility arises from the owner to the claimant and the claimant can sue
the owner directly for the amount of his claim up to the amount due
the contractor in a civil action. The contractor is a necessary party
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2437.25 Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924).
28 Norfolk Bldg. Supply Co. v. Elizabeth City Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87,
97 S. E. 146 (1918).
"7 Boykin v. Logan, 203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932); Porter v. Case,
187 N. C. 629, 122 S. E. 483 (1924) ; Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Morganton Mfg. & Trading
Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914).
28 Bond v. Pickett Cotton Mills, 166 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 936 (1914).
2-172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916).
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along with the owner.30 So the claimant is entitled to have his money
paid him out of the money due the contractor and if he is not paid in
this manner, he can sue the owner for it.
Suit to enforce lien. In order to avail himself of the security af-
forded by the lien the claimant must sue on his claim within six months
after giving his notice to the owner.31 However, if he loses his right
of lien upon the property acquired by giving notice, by failure to sue
upon it in six months, he can still maintain his civil action against the
owner.3 2
Thus it appears that civil action against the owner for judgment
need not be brought within six months from the date of filing the
claim. 33 It also seems unnecessary to file notice of lien with the owner
within six months from the final furnishing of labor and materials;
but rather, notice may be filed so long as there is any money due from
the owner to the contractor. Section 243-8 of the Code provides that
notice may be given at any time before settlement with the contractor.
Payment of claims. It is interesting to note that no claim can be
acquired against the owner except through the lien gained by giving
notice. In case of contractual relations between the owner and the
claimant the right of lien depends upon the existence of a debt. In the
contractor cases there is no debt between the owner and claimant, but
,by giving notice and thereby acquiring a lien the claimant obtains the
right to maintain a civil action against the owner to the extent of the
owner's indebtedness to the creditor just as though the debtor-creditor
relation had existed. There is really a substitution of the sub-con-
tractor, laborer and materialman to the rights of the general contrac-
tor against the owner.3 4
If there are not sufficient funds in the hands of the owner due the
contractor to pay all claims which are filed with him, it is the owner's
duty to pay the claims pro rata. Where there is a contractual relation
between the owner and the claimant, the claims are paid in the order
in which they are filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court. Claim-
ants share pro rata in the fund due the contractor and paid out by the
owner, if the fund is so paid out; if it is not paid out and it is necessary
for the claimant to sue the owner personally, he can have judgment
only for his pro-rata share of the amount due the contractor; and if
'0 Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel & Belt Ry. Co., 109 N. C. 658, 14
S. E. 35 (1891).3
"Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639, 61 S. E. 620 (1908).
" Campbell v. Hall, 187 N. C. 464, 121 S. E. 761 (1924); Morganton Mfg. &
Trading Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914); Perry v. Swanner,
150 N. C. 141, 63 S. E. 611 (1909); Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639,
61 S. E. 620 (1908).
"Campbell v. Hall, 187 N. C. 464, 121 S. E. 761 (1924).
"Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morganton Graded Schools, 150 N. C. 680, 64
S. E. 764 (1909).
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the claimant has perfected his lien by bringing suit upon it, his lien is
effective in securing his claim only to the pro-rata extent.3 5
If at the time notice is filed with the owner there is no money due
by the owner to the contractor, and sums later become due the con-
tractor by the owner, these sums are subject to a lien.8 6
CONVEYANCE BY HEIR OR DEVISEE WITHIN Two YEARs FROm
DEATH OF DECEDENT
A troublesome problem in connection with title examination and
real estate practice is raised when the land is conveyed, or sought to be
conveyed, by a devisee or heir within two years of the date of death of
the decedent. With respect to resident decedents, Section 76 of the
Code provides that all conveyances of real property of a decedent made
by any devisee or heir at law within two years of the death of the
decedent shall be void as to the creditors, executors, administrators
and collectors of such decedent but such conveyances to bona fide pur-
chasers for value and without notice, if made after two years from the
death of the decedent, shall be valid even as against creditors.
The first problem raised under this statute is whether such a con-
veyance made within two years of the death of the decedent is abso-
lutely void or conditionally void. The purpose of the statute is, of
course, to protect creditors of the deceased. It has been uniformly held
that such a conveyance, made within two years, is not absolutely void
but is only conditionally void as against creditors in cases where the
personal estate is not sufficient to pay the debts.3 7 Such a conveyance
is therefore good, even if made within the two-year period, if all the
debts have been paid. If one takes a conveyance from the heir or de-
visee after the expiration of the two-year period from the death of the
decedent, but is not a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice,
then the land is still subject to debts. It has been held that the fact
that the estate has not been settled does not constitute notice of out-
standing debts after the two-year period has run.3 8
In many cases the estate is settled and the personal representative's
final report or account is filed in the Clerk's office at the expiration of
the one-year notice to creditors. Such reports oftentimes recite that
all the debts have been paid. If actually the debts have not been paid
"Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704,
90 S. E. 923 (1916); Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C.
285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supply Co. v. Elizabeth City Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97
S. E. 146 (1918); Borden Brick & Tile Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E.
513,(1915).
" First National Bank of Henderson v. Zollicoffer, 199 N. C. 620, 155 S. E.
449 (1930); Davis v. Perry, 96 N. C. 260, 1 S. E. 610 (1887).
' Johnson v. Barefoot, 208 N. C. 796, 182 S. E. 471 (1935).
1942]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in such a case and are not barred by the statute of limitations, a con-
veyance made between the time of filing such report and the expiration
of the two-year period from the death of the decedent may be set aside,
and the property subjected to the claim of the creditor.
The question has been frequently asked as to whether a conveyance
made during the two-year period is good against creditors after the
expiration of the two years. If the heir or devisee waits until the two
years is out to make his deed, the grantee takes a good title provided
he is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. Thus it
would seem that a conveyance made within the two-year period should
be valid after the expiration of two years. However, the statute reads
differently, and it is believed that the passage of time does not place
the property beyond the reach of creditors.
In Murchison v. Whitted,39 the land was sold within the two years
and then resold by the grantee after that time to a bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice. It was held that the last purchaser ob-
tained good title, on the general principle of equity that the right of the
creditors to set aside the conveyance, being equitable in nature, is cut
off by a sale to an innocent purchaser for value. At the time of this
decision, the statute provided that conveyances made within two years
of qualification of the personal representative could be set aside at the
instance of creditors, but the law was changed in 193540 and the amend-
ment made the limitation begin to run from the death of the decedent
rather than from the grant of letters.
An interesting question arises as to whether encumbered property in
which there is no equity for the general creditors of the estate or for
the heirs or devisees, in whom the legal title is vested, may be released
during the two-year period to the lien creditor, who holds the encum-
brance, by the deed of the heir or devisee, with the joinder of the
personal representative, when the personal representative has been so
authorized by the probate court. Oftentimes, it is desirable to release
such property to the lien creditor by deed rather than have it foreclosed
or otherwise subjected to the payment of the indebtedness secured by
the lien. The purpose of the statute is to make real property available
for the payment of debts when the personal estate is insufficient and
to prevent the heir or devisee from putting it beyond'the reach of the
general creditors. Therefore, it would seem that if the personal repre-
sentative files a petition setting out the facts and showing that there is
no equity for the general creditors, an order might be entered authoriz-
ing the release and empowering the personal representative to join in
a deed from the heirs or devisees to the lien creditor. This practice,
with perhaps some variation in form, is followed in bankruptcy, re-
0 87 N. C. 465 (1882). "1 N. C. PuB. LAws 1935, c. 355.
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ceivership and other liquidations. However, this procedure is not
authorized by any statute and might not be upheld. The validity of
such action might be challenged in a case where the petition failed to
set out the true facts and where there is actually some equity in the
property for the general creditors. If actually there is no equity, then
the general creditors would not be interested in undertaking to subject
the property to their claims.
VIOLATION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIP IN
FORECLOSURE SALEs
There have been several North Carolina cases in recent years in-
volving this subject. Members of the bar have always been acquainted
with the general principle that where the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee exists, a conveyance of the equity of redemption by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee may be subject to attack, and that the
same situation obtains if the mortgagee buys the property at his own
sale. In a number of cases the rule in the mortgagor-mortgagee situa-
tion has been applied by analogy to other trust relationships. The fol-
lowing are the most general of the trust relationships: (1) attorney
and client; (2) principal and agent; (3) partners; (4) trustee and
cestui que trust; (5) guardian and ward; (6) executor and adminis-
trator; (7) mortgagor and mortgagee; (8) parent and child.
Since a tenant in common who buys in the entire estate at an ad-
verse sale is deemed to purchase for the benefit of the co-tenants,41 it
was held in Kelly v. Davis42 that, where one of the tenants in common
conveyed to the other by a warranty deed, and where both were liable
on a mortgage debt on the property, the executor of the grantor, who
bought at the foreclosure sale, took the property in trust for his co-
tenant with a right of lien for one-half of the mortgage debt which he
discharged.
In Sutton v. Sutton4" it was held that one tenant in common, under
an obligation to discharge an encumbrance on the land, may not pro-
cure a foreclosure sale thereunder and acquire either directly or indi-
rectly, the title to the entire interest in the land to the exclusion of his
co-tenant.
In Graham v. Floyd44 it was held that where a guardian ad litem
bid in the property and had the title taken in his wife's name, the
transaction was voidable by the mortgagor.
"It has long been the law that an administrator cannot purchase
property at his own sale, even in good faith, fairly and for a fair price;
"I 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (Enlarged ed. 1920) §201.42211 N. C. 1, 188 S. E. 853 (1936).
"211 N. C. 472, 190 S. E. 718 (1937).
"214 N. C. 77, 197 S. E. 873 (1938).
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certainly he cannot in any case make the purchase without the sanction
or ratification in some sufficient way manifested by those interested.
This rule is well settled and founded in reason, justice and sound
policy. '45
The most familiar case of the application of the rule that one in a
position of trust cannot purchase at his own sale grows out of the rela-
tionship of mortgagor and mortgagee. It has long been the law that
the mortgagee cannot buy at the sale without running the risk of having
the purchase attacked. The law gives the mortgagor, as owner of the
equity of redemption, the right'to have the sale set aside. 40 Similarly,
an officer of a corporate mortgagee may not bid in property and later
deed it to the mortgagee, since such transaction, in substance, is the
same as if the mortgagee itself had purchased.47 However, where the
mortgagee does purchase the property, the sale is not absolutely void
but voidable, at the option of the mortgagor.48 Where the mortgagee
buys at the sale and then conveys the property to an innocent purchaser,
for value, the mortgagor may elect to disavow the foreclosure sale and
recover damages from the mortgagee for the wrongful conversion of
his equity.49
On the same principle of preserving the rights of the mortgagor, a
conveyance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, without sale, is likewise
subject to attack.50
While purchase by the mortgagee at his own sale creates a cloud
upon title, it is well settled in North Carolina that the cestui que trust
has the right to buy at the trust sale unless fraud or collusion is alleged
and proved.51
Likewise, the cestui que trust may take a conveyance of the equity
" Gurganus v. McLawhorn, 212 N. C. 397, 411, 193 S. E. 844, 852 (1937);
Tayloe v. Tayloe, 108 N. C. 69, 73, 12 S. E. 836, 838 (1891).
" Owens v. Branning Mfg. Co., 168 N. C. 397, 84 S. E. 389 (1915) ; Rich v.
Morisey, 149 N. C. 37, 62 S. E. 762 (1908); Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192,
6 S. E. 766 (1888) ; Joyner v. Farmer, 78 N. C. 196 (1878).
'" Council v. Greensboro Jointstock Land Bank, 213 N. C. 329, 196 S. E. 483(1938) ; Shuford v. Greensboro Jointstock Land Bank, 207 N. C. 428, 177 S. E.
408 (1934).
"' Shuford v. Greensboro Jointstock Land Bank, 207 N. C. 428, 177 S. E. 408
(1934) ; Joyner v. Farmer, 78 N. C. 196 (1878).
"' Council v. Greensboro Jointstock Land Bank, 213 N. C. 329, 196 S. E.
483 (1938) ; Davis v. Doggett, 212 N. C. 589, 194 S. E. 288 (1937); Warren v.
Susman, 168 N. C. 457, 84 S. E. 760 (1915).
"Harrelson v. Cox, 207 N. C. 651, 178 S. E. 361 (1935) ; McLeod v. Bullard,
84 N. C. 516 (1881) Rehearing 86 N. C. 210 (1882).
"'Ferguson v. Blanchard, 220 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. (2d) 415 (1941); Murphy v.
Taylor, 214 N. C. 393, 199 S. E. 382 (1938); Hare v. Weil, 213 N. C. 484, 196
S. E. 869 (1938); Hardy v. North Carolina Jointstock Land Bank, 211 N. C.
459, 190 S. E. 730 (1937); Hill v. Albemarle Fertilizer Co., 210 N. C. 417, 187
S. E. 577 (1936); Bunn v. Holliday, 209 N. C. 351, 183 S. E. 278 (1936);
Simpson v. Fry, 194 N. C. 623, 140 S. E. 295 (1927) ; Winchester v. Winchester,
178 N. C. 483, 101 S. E. 25 (1919) ; Hayes v. Pace, 162 N. C. 288, 78 S. E. 290
(1913); Monroe Bros. & Co. v. Fuchtler, 121 N. C. 101, 28 S. E. 63 (1897).
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of redemption from the mortgagor. However, if the conveyance is
induced by fraud or by unfair representations of the trustee, the sale is
open to attack. Where the mortgagor conveyed to the cestui que trust
but it appeared that the trustee, who was active in inducing the deed,
was related to the cestui que trust, and was working for himself or
himself and the cestui que trust, a judgment of non-suit in the mort-
gagor's action -was reversed. 52
While the cestui que trust may take a deed for the equity of re-
demption, or buy at the sale, where there is no fraud or collusion, the
rule is otherwise where the trustee or his agent makes the purchase.
The trustee is required to be impartial in the transaction, without per-
sonal interest. Where an attorney for the trustee sold the property,
bought it in, and took a deed from the trustee, it was held that the
mortgagor might elect to treat the sale as a nullity.53
In a slightly different case, the attorney for the trustee, who was an
officer of the corporate creditor, sold the land and bid it in for the cor-
porate creditor. It was held that the attorney was agent for the trustee,
the seller, and also for the purchaser. The plaintiff's verdict for wrong-
ful conversion of his equity was held to stand.54
The most important case of this general type is that of Mills v.
Mutual Building & Loan Assn.55 Therein, the trustee was an executive
officer of the defendant Building and Loan Association. He authorized
the amount of the bid, sold the land as trustee, bid it in for the defendant
Building and Loan Association, and then executed deed to said de-
fendant which resold the land to an innocent purchaser. The case was
a civil action for accounting and to recover damages for breach of trust
in making a wrongful foreclosure. It was held that the relationship
was actually that of mortgagor and mortgagee and that the plaintiff
was entitled to take his case to the jury.
This decision received much attention among attorneys engaged in
real estate practice; for there have undoubtedly been many instances of
foreclosure sales where the trustee, although connected in some way
with the lender, has bid in the property for the mortgage creditor.
Many lawyers have innocently engaged in this practice, not realizing
the legal implications. As a result of the decision the matter was taken
to the 1941 Legislature and an act was passed which provides that "No
action or proceeding shall be brought or defense or counterclaim plead-
ed later than one year after the ratification of this section in which a
foreclosure sale which occurred prior to January 1, 1941, under a deed
' Hinton v. West, 207 N. C. 708, 178 S. E. 356 (1935).
Lockridge v. Smith, 206 N. C. 174, 173 S. E. 36 (1934).
5' Davis v. Doggett, 212 N. C. 589, 194 S. E. 288 (1937).
216 N. C. 664, 6 S. E. (2d) 549 (1939).
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of trust conveying real estate as security for a debt is attacked or other-
wise questioned upon the ground that the trustee was an officer, direc-
tor, attorney, agent or employee of the owner of the whole or any part
of the debt secured thereby, or upon the ground that the trustee and
the owner of the debt or any part thereof have common officers, direc-
tors, attorneys, agents or employees."5 6
EXAMINATION OF TRUSTEE'S ADVERSE CONVEYANCES
Many of today's titles are dependent on trustees' deeds under deeds
of trust conveying one or more parcels of land to secure the payment of
debt. Under the original deeds of trust, title is vested in the trustee.
If the trustee should release a portion of the land to the mortgagor, or
his grantee, or a subsequent grantee, and there should later be a fore-
closure of the deed of trust, and the trustee erroneously includes the
entire tract in the description of the property conveyed, quite clearly,
the trustee's deed would not pass title to the portion released. There
may be a question as to the validity of such a release in which the
holder of the indebtedness does not join, but for present purposes we
assume a valid release either by the trustee alone or by the trustee with
the joinder of the holder of the indebtedness.
Many attorneys fail to examine all the conveyances made by the
trustee during the period from the creation and registration of the deed
of trust to the time of the foreclosure. In most communities a few
individuals are named trustee in large numbers of instruments and to
examine their adverse conveyances adds materially to the work. How-
ever, a release by the trustee can generally be found only by examining
the trustee's cross-conveyances. It might possibly be found by check-
ing the mortgagor's conveyances during the period from the creation
of the deed of trust to the foreclosure provided the practice is followed
in the Register of Deeds office of cross-indexing such instruments under
the name of the maker of the deed of trust, as is done in the case of
trustees' deeds. However, there is a difference in that a release deed
runs in favor of the mortgagor, his grantee or a subsequent grantee,
while a trustee's deed in foreclosure is a conveyance against the mort-
gagor. Furthermore, lawyers do not examine the mortgagor's convey-
ances during such period where the title is found to be good in the
mortgagor at the time of the registration of the deed of trust. Since
the holder of the indebtedness may not be known, the only sure way
of finding such a release deed is by examining the conveyances of the
trustee.
" N. C. PUB. LAWS 1941, c. 202; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1941 Supp.)§2584(c).
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EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO EASEMENT RIGHTS
Easements over adjoining property may tend to increase the value
of land. The value of many properties, especially in cities, depends
upon the means of ingress and egress, and on other easements. In the
case of homes, it is quite common to find joint driveways between two
properties, with the land contributed by both owners, each having an
easement over the portion of the land contributed by the other. Such
a situation will eliminate the necessity of an additional driveway. In
business districts the buildings usually occupy most of the space on
the important streets and ingress and egress is afforded to the rear of
the buildings by several alleys, which usually enter the block from
streets on which the property is less valuable. Thus a number of
buildings may be serviced by a few inside alleys. Party walls between
business buildings tend to reduce construction costs, as such walls save
the cost of erecting complete walls for every building. Utility easements,
such as rights of way for telephone and telegraph lines, water lines
and pipe lines, are both common and necessary. Thus the easement
over a servient tenement may considerably enhance the value of the
dominant tenement.
Where such an easement is appurtenant to the locus in quo, and an
examination is made of the title to the property, it is essential to know
that the title to the easement is good, as well as to know that the title
to the locus in quo is good.
If, for instance, a joint alleyway is created between two properties
and there is an outstanding mortgage on one of the properties at the
time of the right of way agreement and the holder of the mortgage does
not join in the agreement, and there is a subsequent foreclosure of the
mortgage, the purchaser at the sale takes free and clear of the ease-
ment, and is not bound to give it validity unless he chooses. Likewise,
in the case of the erection of a party wall, if there is an unsatisfied
mortgage on one of the properties at the time of the agreement and the
holder does not join in, and there is a later foreclosure, the purchaser
is not bound by the agreement. Of course, in such cases, the new pur-
chaser will generally want the easement to stand, as it is probably of as
much benefit to his property as to the other property.
However, it is necessary to examine the title to the easement in
order to be sure that the title to the appurtenance is good. Where busi-
ness property is serviced by alleyways, and it is necessary to use these
alleys in order to bring in goods for sale in retail stores, the value of
the easements is very considerable. In such cases, it is sometimes
necessary to examine a number of other titles in order to be able to
establish good title to the easement.
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Likewise, in drawing such easement and right of way agreements,
in order to make them effective, care should be taken to make sure that
all parties in interest in the servient tenement, including lienholders,
sign the agreement. Otherwise, one of the situations pointed out above
can very readily arise.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The building restriction is in general use today, especially in high-
grade residential sections. The theory behind such restrictions is to
so limit the use that may be made of property as to require compliance
with certain standards, thereby maintaining the character of the neigh-
borhood. These restrictions are generally set out in deeds executed by
the owner or developer of the subdivision. Such restrictive covenants
generally deal with the subjects of setback lines, both front and side,
minimum building costs, racial occupancy, residential and commercial
use, and other matters having to do with the improvement and use of
land.
In the acquisition of property today it is just as important to know
what use can be made of it as it is to know that the title is good. Limi-
tations on use are generally found in the building restrictions, if any,
and in municipal ordinances. Therefore, this subject should be care-
fully examined at the time of purchase or loan. Very few restrictions
in general use today carry reversionary clauses and the violation of the
restrictions does not forfeit the title. However, such violation may
make it impossible to borrow money on the property unless the viola-
tion is trivial and does not impair the value.
Minor violations, such as failure to meet by a few inches the setback
restrictions, are generally not considered serious. Violations of restric-
tions concerning minimum building costs are in the same category.
However, the degree of violation may become important in any case and
may affect the marketability of the title.
The restrictions sometimes contain provisions for curing violations
by quitclaim deeds from the adjoining owners. In such a case it is
necessary to proceed exactly in accordance with the wording of the
curing provision. Where there is no provision for curing, it is neces-
sary to either pass the violation or obtain, quitclaim deeds from all those
who can possibly have any interest in the matter. This is difficult to
determine, as it is generally considered that when a subdivision is laid
out under a general plan or scheme of development and uniform re-
strictions are inserted in all the deeds, that all owners in the subdivision
may have an interest in the maintenance of the restrictions with refer-
ence to every lot. In some cases, it may be considered that only those
in a particular block have any real interest and that their quitclaim
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deeds will be sufficient. Where such deeds are obtained, lienholders
must join in the execution of the deed.
Such restrictions are generally considered to be equitable, negative
easements, and, are so held to be in this State. 57  Such easements are
within the Statute of Frauds and may not be proven by parol ;58 and
since a writing is required, the provisions of the Connor Act are ap-
plicable with respect to notice.
Mutual restrictions are enforceable between owners of properties in
the same subdivision only when there is a general plan or scheme of
development with the intent that it shall affect the whole property.5 9
Whether there is such a common plan or scheme of development de-
pends upon whether or not substantially the same restrictions are in-
serted in all the deeds, whether part of the lots are affected with restric-
tions while others are conveyed without restrictions, whether the right
to change and alter the restrictions is reserved by the developer and
the owner of each lot, and similar facts. This does not mean, however,
that identical provisions must be inserted in all the deeds. Minimum
cost restrictions may vary in the various blocks. It was held in Pepper
v. Development Co.60 that where a development company sells adjoining
lots with different restrictions as to cost, it is not liable to the owner of
one lot for damages by reason of the fact that the deed to the adjoining
lot provided for a smaller cost.
Where the character of a neighborhood changes substantially, so
that it is no longer equitable to enforce restrictions, equity will inter-
vene and grant relief. In such a case the restrictions will not be en-
forced.6 ' Perhaps the chief illustration of this case is where a residen-
tial neighborhood is invaded by business and has to give way to natural
progress and development.
There are many interesting situations in the law of this subject with
reference to definitions and the construction of various restrictional pro-
visions. Many such restrictions limit the use of property to residential
purposes and prohibit the erection of more than one residence or dwell-
ing house on a given lot. In Bailey v. Jackson,2 it was held that where
the restrictions provided that not more than one residence could be
built, an apartment house could not be constructed, as it contained more
than one residence. The word "residence", however, is more restricted
" Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
58 Ibid.
"'Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N. C. 15, 200 S. E. 918 (1939) ; Snyder v. Heath,
185 N. C. 362, 117 S. E. 294 (1923) ; Meyers Park Homes Co. v. Falls, 184 N. C.
426, 115 S. E. 184 (1922).
60211 N. C. 166, 189 S. E. 628 (1937).
'" Bass v. Hunter, 216 N. C. 505, 5 S. E. (2d) 558 (1939) ; Elrod v. Phillips,
214 N. C. 472, 199 S. E. 722 (1938).62191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1926).
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in meaning than the wording "dwelling house". It has been held that
a provision containing the word "dwelling" or "dwelling house" in-
cludes an apartment house and therefore that an apartment can be built
although the restriction prohibits the erection of more than one dwell-
ini.3 The theory is that a dwelling house is a broader term than resi-
dence and may refer to a building in which more than one family
resides.
It is well settled that where restrictions are applicable, and there
is a threatened violation, the courts will enjoin the violation.0 4
With respect to the results of mortgage foreclosure, restrictions
occupy the same position as a conveyance of an interest in land or any
other encumbrance. Thus where restrictions were imposed on land
after the registration of a deed of trust, which was later foreclosed,
the land was freed from the operation of the restrictions by reason of
the foreclosure. 65
PAROL TRUSTS
One of the difficult problems in title examination and real estate
practice is that which is presented when a lawyer has information which
leads him to believe that the land is really owned by someone other than
the holder of the record title. Sometimes this fact is definitely stated
to be the case. It oftentimes arises when the true owner is in financial
difficulties or has judgments docketed against him. He then resorts
to the device of acquiring or keeping property in the name of some
other person. Will a deed or monetary lien from the holder of the
record title be good?
The subject of parol trusts in North Carolina is discussed in an
article in the North Carolina Law Review by Lord and Van Hecke.0 6
There is no statute in North Carolina specifically requiring the creation
or proof of trusts in land to be in writing. The seventh section of the
English Statute of Frauds67 which provides that declarations or crea-
tions of uses or trusts in lands must be manifested and proved by a
memorandum signed by the party declaring the trust, has never been
adopted in North Carolina, although it has been adopted in many states.
Section 988 of the North Carolina Code, requiring all contracts to sell
or convey lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest therein,
and all leases and contracts for leases exceeding three years in duration
to be in writing, applies to legal interests in land, and not to equitable
interests.
"' Charlotte Consolidated Constr. Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C. 690. 143 S. E. 522(1928) ; DeLaney v. Van Ness, 193 N. C. 721 138 S. E. 28 (1927).
Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co., 191 N. 6. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1926) ; John-
ston v. Garrett, 190 N. C. 835, 130 S. E. 835 (1925).
"St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Foster, 211 N. C. 331, 190 S. E. 522 (1937).
66 Lord and Van Hecke, Parol Trusts in North Carolina (1930) 8 N. C.
L. Rev. 152. 1'29 CAR. II, c. 3, §7 (1676).
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It has also been held that the Connor Act applies only to written in-
struments capable of registration and not to parol trusts.68
The question next arises as to what parol trusts are cognizable under
the law of the State of North Carolina. As pointed out in the Law
Review article above cited, the only parol trust recognized by the courts
of this State is one created prior to or contemporaneously with a con-
veyance by A to B for the benefit of C. That is, if A conveys to B
and it is understood at the time of the conveyance that B is to hold in
trust for C, then a parol trust arises. This is a trust created by oral
agreement. Other trusts are created by law, as resulting trusts and
constructive trusts. The resulting trusts are more numerous and gen-
erally obtain where the purchase price of land is paid by one and the
title is taken in the name of another. In such case there is a resulting
trust in favor of the one who paid the money. A good summary of
the law of resulting trusts is to be found in Tire Co. v. Lester.69 It was
there held that one who furnishes the purchase money at the time of
purchase has a trust whether expressed or not. A resulting trust is
not within the Statute of Frauds, but can only be proved by clear, strong
and convincing evidence.
In Pritchard v. Williams 0 it was held that a parol trust is valid
against the holder of the legal title unless the latter is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value and without notice of the equity. Former Chief Justice
Clark dissented on the ground that the Connor Act was intended to
strike down equities arising by parol or by implication of law, thus
making the recording acts applicable to equitable as well as legal in-
terests. In Roberts v. Massey71 it was held that the Connor Act does
not apply to equities which rest in parol and are, therefore, incapable of
registration. In Spence v. Pottery Co.72 a title had been taken in the
name of the husband, although the wife furnished part of the purchase
money. She sued to have the title established as an entirety when it
was about to be sold to satisfy judgments against her husband. It was
held that she was entitled to show a resulting trust, which is not within
the Connor Act, even though this result had the effect of eliminating
the judgment creditors who were deemed to take no higher interest than
their, judgment debtor.
From the foregoing it appears that oral trusts, equitable in their
nature, are not prohibited in North Carolina by the Statute of Frauds,
. Sansom v. Warren, 215 N. C. 432, 2 S. E. (2d) 459 (1939); Spence v.
Foster Pottery Co., 185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 32 (1923) ; Roberts v. Massey, 185
N. C. 164, 116 S. E. 407 (1923) ; Pritchard v. Williams, 175 N. C. 319, 95 S. E.
570 (1918).
" 190 N. C. 411, 130 S. E. 45 (1925).
7o175 N. C. 319, 95 S. E. 570 (1918).
71185 N. C. 164, 116 S. E. 407 (1923).
'1 185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 32 (1923).
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the seventh section of the English Statute not having been adopted in
this State. North Carolina recognizes oral trusts created prior to or
simultaneously with a -conveyance and also recognizes certain trusts
created by implication of law, as resulting and constructive trusts. Since
these equities do not constitute legal interests in land, but equitable in-
terests, they are held not to come within the statute requiring a writing.
The Connor Act is then held to apply only to contracts and conveyances
required to be in writing and since these equities are not in writing they
do not come within the terms of the Connor Act. Therefore, they are
effective against the holder of the legal title unless that holder is a bona
fide purchaser for value, without notice, in which case the equity is cut
off upon general equitable principles.
Thus if it is admitted that the legal title is in one person and that
another really owns the land, a purchase or loan transaction cannot
safely be had with the holder of the legal title without barring the holder
of the equitable interest. This may be done by having the equitable
holder quitclaim all his interest to the holder of the legal title or by
having him otherwise surrender his equity. This article does not pur-
port to discuss the question of whether or not an attorney's notice of
an outstanding equitable interest would be held to bind his client, but
it is much safer to proceed on the theory that it would. Of course, if
there is no knowledge of the equity, and if the transaction is for value,
the equity is cut off.
LUNACY
Conveyances by persons non compos mentis may be set aside. This
is elementary law. In order to give notice of the names of persons who
have been judicially declared to be of unsound mind, a lunacy docket
is kept in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court. This docket
shows the names of all such persons and the date of adjudication. It is
believed that this book is not generally examined by lawyers in making
title searches. However, since the lunacy docket is a public record,
failure to examine it would probably be held to constitute negligence.
In the making of a conveyance, the inchoate right of dower of an
insane wife may be conveyed by the husband provided he follows the
provisions of the statutes. Section 1004 of the Code provides that
"Every man whose wife is a lunatic or insane and whose homestead has
been allotted, may bargain, sell, release, mortgage, transfer and convey
any of his real estate by deed, mortgage deed, deed of trust or lease,
except his homestead, without the signature or private examination of
his wife: Provided, that the clerk of the superior court of the county
in which the wife was adjudged a lunatic or declared insane, or the
superintendent of an insane institution of the state, or any other state,
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shall certify under his hand and seal that she has been adjudged a
lunatic or declared insane, and that her sanity has not been declared
restored as is provided by law, and this certificate must be attached to
the husband's deed, mortgage deed, deed of trust, or lease." 73  This
section does not apply to the homestead of the husband.
The above section was re-enacted in 1923,74 and is now Section
4103(a) of the Code.7 5 In a summary of 1923 statutory changes in
the North Carolina Law Review76 it is stated that Chapter 65 of the
Public Laws of 1923 re-enacts Section 1004 of the Code which is not
referred to in the Act.
However, there is a question as to whether or not the 1923 enact-
ment does not eliminate the former requirement that the homestead be
allotted before a husband may, by following the statute, convey his wife's
dower. It will be noted that at the very beginning of Section 1004 it is
provided that every man whose wife is a lunatic or insane and whose
homestead has been allotted, may bargain, sell, etc., any of his real es-
tate. At the end of the section it is expressly provided that the section
does not apply to the homestead. The intent of the section seems to
be that if a homestead has been allotted to a man with an insane wife he
may dispose of the rest of his property and convey his wife's dower.
But he cannot so convey her dower until the homestead has been laid
off. In Section 4103 (a) the right to convey the dower is not condi-
tional upon the homestead having been allotted but there is a provision
that the section shall not apply to the homestead of the husband which
has been actually allotted. Thus, under the later statute, supposedly a
re-enactment of the older statute, the only requirement, so far as
homestead is concerned, is that the section is not applicable to a home-
stead that has been actually allotted. If this be a correct interpretation,
then the statute is applicable to a conveyance by a husband of any of
his lands prior to an allotment. Thus there would be a conflict between
the two statutes. The 1923 enactment, Chapter 65 of the Public Laws
of 1923, provides in the second section that all laws and clauses of laws
in conflict with the Act are repealed to the extent of such conflict.
Both sections are carried up in the Code and the apparent conflict
may give rise to a serious question as to the validity of a conveyance
made in accordance with the statute where no homestead has been al-
lotted. Neither statute is applicable to any homestead that has been
laid off.
71 N. C. CoDm ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1004.
"IN. C. PuB. LAWS 1923, c. 65, §1.
7 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4103(a).
6Statutory Changes, Conveyances (1923) 1 N. C. L. Rev. 271.
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Lis PENDENS
At common law the docketing of a lis pendens meant that any person
who took or acquired an interest in land with notice of the pendency
of any action affecting the title to said land took with notice and was
bound by the judgment. The matter of lis pendens is now regulated
by statute in this State, and Section 500 of the Code provides that the
plaintiff, at or after the time of filing his complaint in which the title
to realty is sought to be affected, or when or after attachment is issued,
or the defendant, when he sets up an affirmative cause of action, or
after filing answer, it is intended to affect realty, may file with the Clerk
a notice of lis pendens.
Where the action is brought in the county where the land is situated
and the pleadings contain the names of the parties, the object of the
action and the description of the property to be affected in that county,
it is not necessary to file a formal notice, as the complaint takes the
place of the notice.77
In order to place third parties on notice of the lis pendens, the same
must be cross-indexed, whether notice be given formally by notice of
the lis pendens or informally by asking that the complaint be regarded
as a notice.78 This notice must be filed in a book kept in the Clerls
office called "Record of Lis Pendens". The index must contain the
names of the parties, where the notice is filed, the object of the action,
the date of indexing and a description of the land sought to be affected.
In many Clerks' offices in the State, notice of lis pendens is indexed in
the judgment indices and is also indexed in the lis pendens book.
The notice of ]is pendens is void unless it is followed by the first
publication of notice of the summons or by an order therefor, or by
personal service on the defendant within sixty days after the cro~s-
indexing.79
The notice of lis pendens may be cancelled by order of court or
voluntarily by endorsement on the margin of the record by the plaintiff,
his agent or attorney.8
0
MATTERS NOT OF REcoRD
In the examination of titles, it is generally understood that the
examination covers the public records. Usually, attorneys' certificates
of title are limited to the public records. However, there are a number
of items in connection with closing the ordinary purchase and sale or
"'Jarrett v. Holland, 213 N. C. 428, 196 S. E. 314 (1938); Collingwood v.
Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 10 S. E. 868 (1890).
'IN. C. CODE A-N. (Michie, 1939) §501.
"' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §503.
80 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §504.
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loan transaction which are not of record. These points should be in-
quired into.
Labor and material liens. The matter of mechanics' liens is dis-
cussed more fully elsewhere in this article. Where new improvements
have been placed upon the property and the statutory period for filing
liens has not expired, or full settlement has not been made between the
owner and the contractor, if there was a contractor, it may be that there
are outstanding claims for labor and materials furnished. The purchaser
or lender, in order to be protected, must know whether there are any
such claims outstanding. This is a matter outside the record. Protec-
tion should be furnished by waiver of lien, title insurance or indemnity
bond.
Unrecorded leases. Under the law of this State leases for periods
of time up to three years do not have to be in writing.8 ' Therefore,
such leases cannot be recorded and do not become a matter of public
record. Furthermore, written leases for three years or less do not have
to be recorded in order to be good against creditors or purchasers for
value.82 Therefore, a tenant in possession under a verbal lease for
three years or less or under an unrecorded written lease for the same
term may remain in possession, despite a change of ownership, provided
he complies with the terms of the tenancy. Therefore, in the case of
transfer of property the new owner should become familiar with any
tenancy arrangements which may not be disclosed by the public records.
Water rents. Municipal water rents are usually secured by statu-
tory liens against the property, even though the water bill may have
been incurred by a tenant. Water records are not generally considered
as public records although the status of the account can be ascertained
by proper inquiry. The amount involved is usually small, as water
charges are generally not high and in most cases some deposit is re-
quired. This is another instance of a matter beyond the public records
which may affect title to the extent of unpaid water charges.
Zoning laws. The subject of municipal zoning law has become an
important one in recent years. As cities become more populous, regu-
lation of the use of property increases. Nearly all incorporated towns
and cities now have certain requirements with respect to the types of
building and construction which may be erected. Cities are now laid
off into residential zones and business zones. Residential zones are
subdivided into apartment and single-family occupancy sections. Prop-
erty may be used for certain types of businesses subject only to munic-
ipal approval. The location of buildings is likewise governed and
regulated, with minimum setback restrictions. This subject consti-
:IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §988.2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3309.
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tutes a gradually expanding field. The uses that may be made of
property may be just as important to a purchaser as the fact of market-
able title. In order to know the applicable rules, it is necessary to
examine the zoning ordinances.
Survey. One of the most important matters in connection with
real estate practice is that of adequate survey. Many deeds are old
and the chain of title has been continued by using descriptions from
prior deeds, without a modern survey of the property. Such survey is
necessary to make sure that the improvements are located on the locus
in quo and that there is no conflict of lines with adjoining owners. Only
by an exact survey can the size and shape of the property be adequately
determined. Conflict is often found between the record title and the
physical status of the property as revealed by competent surveying and
engineering. Oftentimes, the corners are not in and have to be put in
by the surveyor.
Corporate lenders generally require a survey in connection with
their loans. Individual purchasers and lenders oftentimes complete
their transactions without a survey, but it is submitted that this is
shortsighted policy, as the ordinary financial transaction certainly justi-
fies the small cost involved in obtaining an adequate blueprint of the
property. The title insurance companies make an exception in their
policies of all matters which would be disclosed by an accurate survey
of the premises unless such survey is furnished.
TAx TITLEs
A tax title differs from a title derived through ordinary sources in
that it is not dependent upon previous links in the chain of title. On
the contrary, it is a new title, and has the. effect of breaking up all pre-
vious sources of title. A tax deed executed at the conclusion of the
legal procedure required for perfecting it will eliminate the rights of
all previous parties in interest, including mortgagees and holders of
easements. It bars the right of homestead and the inchoate right of
dower. Its only connection with previous title is found in the statutory
requirements with respect to the persons who are necessary parties in
the tax foreclosure proceeding which results in the tax title. Since a
tax title operates on the property and destroys all previous interests in
the land, it is obvious that the statutory procedure for the foreclosure of
a tax lien and the making of a tax deed must be precisely followed.
The courts have always required that the procedure for divesting
an owner of title to his property on account of delinquent taxes must
be followed strictly in accordance with the law. As a general rule, tax
titles have been stricken down for defects which would not ordinarily
cause a reversal of judgment. The courts have always been diligent
in their effort to protect persons in their ownership of land. Therefore,
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tax titles are generally looked upon with a great deal of distrust and
suspicion, and purchasers have been reluctant to accept tax titles. This
attitude is so general that the title insurance companies ordinarily will
not insure any title dependent solely upon the foreclosure of a tax lien.
This is a point of tremendous importance from the standpoint of market-
ability. New owners generally require financing in connection with the
improvement of their property and since many lenders now require title
insurance, a purchaser takes a risk of not being able to obtain his financ-
ing if he buys a tax deed. In recent years the counties and municipali-
ties in North Carolina have acquired very large numbers of properties
for delinquent taxes. Since many of these properties cannot be resold
where the title is dependent solely upon the tax foreclosure proceedings,
these cities and counties in many cases make an effort to obtain deeds
from the owners, and in other cases buy up outstanding mortgages in
order that the titles may be so perfected that they are not dependent
upon the tax deeds.
Although the title may not be insurable, it is indisputable that good
title can be acquired through the present tax foreclosure system in
effect in this State. A few cases will show some of the points that have
arisen in connection with this procedure.
In Orange County v. Jenkinss3 it was held that the statutory notice
of foreclosure of tax certificates is constitutional and valid.
In Johnston County v. Smith8 4 there was a proceeding to enforce
the County's lien for unpaid taxes and the Clerk ordered a resale "ac-
cording to the statute". The applicable statute provided that such sale
could be had only on certain days during the term of the Superior Court,
and the resale was had on another day. It was held that the resale was
void but that another sale might be ordered. Likewise, in Caswell
County v. Scott85 it was held that a tax sale held on an improper day
was void.
In Harnett County v. Rearden8 6 the tax sale was set aside for ir-
regularity. In Buncombe County v. Penland87 the sale was set aside
because the property was not properly listed and because of improper
publication.
In Wake County v. Faison88 the land was listed in the name of a
person other than the true owner and was sold for taxes. It was held
that the purchaser's title at foreclosure sale was not good.
The present tax foreclosure law provides for a proceeding in the
nature of an action to foreclose a mortgage. Therefore, all persons in
:'200 N. C. 202, 156 S. E. 774 (1931).
84203 N. C. 255, 165 S. E. 707 (1932).
85215 N. C. 185, 1 S. E. (2d) 364 (1939).
88203 N. C. 267, 165 S. E. 701 (1932).
87206 N. C. 299, 173 S. E. 609 (1934).
88204 N. C. 55, 167 S. E. 391 (1933).
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interest are required to be made parties. Such persons, in number, are
mainly the owners and mortgagees. In Madison County v. Coxe80 the
trustee and mortgage creditor were not given notice and the sale was
set aside. In Steed v. Hildebrand0 a mortgagee made his appearance
within six months from service by publication and tendered the taxes
due. It was held that such mortgagee was not barred and was entitled
to redeem. In Buncombe County v. Arbogast91 the mortgagee was not
made a party and the sale was set aside for irregularity. Likewise in
Orange County v. Atkinson92 it was held that the mortgagee must be
made a party. Substantially the same situation obtained in Johnston
County v. Stewart0 3, with the same result.
For the tax foreclosure proceeding to be valid, the property must
be sufficiently described in the listing. In Johnston County v.
Stewart9 4 the land was listed as "4 lots lying and being in Banner
Township, Johnston County." This was held to be an insufficient list-
ing. In Craven County v. Parker95 a listing of "250 acres Washington
Road, No. 1 Township", was held sufficient.
The present system of foreclosing tax liens 0 is the only one avail-
able to private purchasers of the tax certificate. The law provides
that such method of foreclosure is the only remedy open to certificate
holders other than taxing units. A county or municipality may en-
force its lien by this method or by the alternative method set out in
Section 7990 of the Code.
The cases construing said Section 7990 have generally held that
when an action is brought by a taxing unit, pursuant to the section,
that the statute of limitations is not applicable, on the theory that the
statute cannot run against the sovereign. City of Raleigh v. Jordan"7
was an action by a municipality under C. S. 7990 to foreclose a tax
lien for the years 1925 and 1926. The court held that the action was
barred by the provisions of Chapter 181, Section 7, of the Public Laws
of 1933-. The basis of the decision was the apparent intent of the
legislature to bar the enforcement of all liens for unpaid taxes for
1926 and prior years, regardless of the statute under which the action
might be brought. Under this holding, the foreclosure of all tax
liens for 1926 and prior years is barred even though the action be one
by a county or municipality under Section 7990.
8"1204 N. C. 58, 167 S. E. 486 (1933).
00205 N. C. 208, 171 S. E. 58 (1933).
"-205 N. C. 745, 172 S. E. 364 (1934).
-2207 N. C. 593, 178 S. E. 91 (1935).
"217 N. C. 334, 7 S. E. (Zd) 708 (1940).
" Ibid.
' 194 N. C. 561, 140 S. E. 155 (1927).
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7971 (228) ; Logan v. Griffith, 205 N. C.
580. 172 S. E. 348 (1934).




The lawyer's part in a real estate transaction, whether it be a pur-
chase or a loan, generally comes to an end with the closing. This
involves the preparation of the papers and the title certificate. The
transactions are generally consummated in the lawyer's office and he
should see to the competency of the parties to enter into the transac-
tion. The signatures should be carefully checked, using the legal
signatures of the parties, and the acknowledgments should be in order.
The persons acknowledging the execution of the instrument should
personally appear before the Notary so that the acknowledgment will
speak the truth. There has been a tendency to laxness on the part
of Notaries with respect to execution of acknowledgments. Where
there is a recital of the privy examination of the wife, such privy
examination should be actually taken, as required by the statute. This
is an important point.
Where required, documentary stamps should be affixed to the in-
struments. The parties will generally conclude the financial settle-
ment, but very often this is under the supervision of the attorney. In
purchase and sale transactions, current taxes and rents are generally
apportioned. The tax lien now dates from January 1st of each year.
The seller usually pays the taxes from January 1st until the time of
the transaction and the purchaser pays for the remainder of the year.
Fire insurance may be taken over by the purchaser or he may obtain
new insurance.
In the case of improved property it is important that proper en-
dorsements be placed upon the fire insurance policies. The ownership
should be in accordance with the record ownership. Where the trans-
action is one of purchase, an endorsement should be added showing
the new owners. Where the transaction is a loan, a mortgagee clause
should be attached making the loss payable firstly to the mortgagee.
In such case it is advisable to use the standard clause without full con-
tribution, as this will protect the creditor, without pro-ration, in the
event other insurance is acquired and with respect to which no mort-
gage clause is attached.
After all other details are attended to, the papers are recorded.
Just prior to probate and registration, a last-minute search should be
made of the records in order to make sure that no new liens or objec-
tions to title have come into the records since the date of the title
examination. This is a very important point and should never be
overlooked.
Where the transaction is a sale, with a purchase money mortgage,
both instruments should be recorded at the same time. Since indexing
is an integral part of registration, the transaction should be followed
up to the extent of making sure that there has been proper permanent
indexing.
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